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We consider a power system with N transmission lines whose initial loads (i.e., power flows)
L1, . . . , LN are independent and identically distributed with PL(x) = P [L ≤ x]. The capacity Ci
defines the maximum flow allowed on line i, and is assumed to be given by Ci = (1 + α)Li, with
α > 0. We study the robustness of this power system against random attacks (or, failures) that
target a p-fraction of the lines, under a democratic fiber bundle-like model. Namely, when a line fails,
the load it was carrying is redistributed equally among the remaining lines. Our contributions are as
follows: i) we show analytically that the final breakdown of the system always takes place through
a first-order transition at the critical attack size p⋆ = 1− E[L]
maxx(P[L>x](αx+E[L | L>x]))
, where E [·] is
the expectation operator; ii) we derive conditions on the distribution PL(x) for which the first order
break down of the system occurs abruptly without any preceding diverging rate of failure; iii) we
provide a detailed analysis of the robustness of the system under three specific load distributions:
Uniform, Pareto, and Weibull, showing that with the minimum load Lmin and mean load E [L]
fixed, Pareto distribution is the worst (in terms of robustness) among the three, whereas Weibull
distribution is the best with shape parameter selected relatively large; iv) we provide numerical
results that confirm our mean-field analysis; and v) we show that p⋆ is maximized when the load
distribution is a Dirac delta function centered at E [L], i.e., when all lines carry the same load;
we also show that optimal p⋆ equals α
α+1
. This last finding is particularly surprising given that
heterogeneity is known to lead to high robustness against random failures in many other systems.
PACS numbers: 64.60.Ht, 62.20.M-, 89.75.-k, 02.50.-r
I. INTRODUCTION
As we embark on a future where the demand for elec-
tricity power is greater than ever, and the quality of life
of the society highly depends on the continuous func-
tioning of power grid, a fundamental question arises as
to how we can design a power system in a robust and
reliable manner. A major concern regarding such sys-
tems are the seemingly unexpected large scale failures.
Although rare, the sheer size of such failures has proven
to be very costly, at times affecting hundreds of millions
of people [1, 2]; e.g., the recent blackout in India [3, 4].
Such events are often attributed to a small initial shock
getting escalated due to intricate dependencies within a
power system [5–7]. This phenomenon, also known as
cascade of failures, has the potential of collapsing an en-
tire power system as well as other infrastructures that
depend on the power grid [8–10]; e.g., water, transport,
communications, etc. Therefore, understanding the dy-
namics of failures in power systems and mitigating the
potential risks are critical for the successful development
and evolution of many critical infrastructures.
In this work, we study the robustness of power sys-
tems under a democratic fiber bundle-like model [11–13],
which is based on the equal redistribution of load upon
the failure of a power line. It was suggested by Pahwa
et al. [11] that equal load redistribution can be a rea-
sonable assumption (in the mean-field sense) due to the
long-range nature of Kirchoff’s law. This is especially so
under the DC power flow model that approximates the
standard AC power flow model when the phase differ-
ences along the branches are small and the bus voltages
are fixed [11]. In many cases, power flow calculations
based on the DC model is known [14, 15] to give accu-
rate results that match the AC model calculations.
Our problem setting is as follows: We consider N
transmission lines whose initial loads (i.e., power flows)
L1, . . . , LN are independently drawn from a distribution
PL(x) = P [L ≤ x]. The maximum flow allowed on a line
i defines its capacity, and is given by Ci = (1+α)Li with
α > 0 denoting the tolerance parameter. If a line fails (for
any reason), its load will be redistributed equally among
all lines that are alive, meaning that the load carried by a
line may increase over time. We also assume that any line
whose load exceeds its capacity will be tripped (i.e., dis-
connected) by means of automatic protective equipments
so as to avoid costly damages to the system.
We study the robustness of this system against random
attacks (or, failures) that target a p-fraction of the lines.
The failure of the p-fraction of lines may cause further
failures in the system due to flows of some of the lines
exceeding their capacity. Subsequently, their load will be
redistributed which in turn may cause further failures,
and so on until the cascade of failures stops; note that
this process is guaranteed to converge, at the very least
when all lines in the system fail.
One of our important findings is to show the existence
of a critical threshold on the attack size p, denoted by p⋆,
below which a considerable fraction lines remain func-
tional at the steady state; on the other hand, if p > p⋆,
the entire system collapses. We show that the critical at-
tack size is given by p⋆ = 1− E[L]maxx(P[L>x](αx+E[L | L>x])) ,
where E [·] denotes the expectation operator. In addi-
tion, we show that the phase transition at p⋆ is always
first-order; i.e., the variation of the “fraction of functional
lines at the steady state” with respect to “attack size p”
2has a discontinuous first derivative. In a nutshell, what
this means is that power systems under the democratic
fiber bundle model tend to exhibit very large changes to
small variations on the failure size (around p⋆), render-
ing their robustness unpredictable from previous data. In
fact, this type of first order phase transition is attributed
[6] to be the origin of large but rare blackouts seen in real
world, in a way explaining how small initial shocks can
cascade to collapse large systems that have proven stable
with respect to similar disturbances in the past.
Our second main contribution is to demonstrate the
clear distinction between the case where the first order
break down of the system occurs abruptly without any
preceding diverging rate of failure versus the case where
a second order transition precedes the first-order break-
down. In the former case, if p < p⋆ the final fraction of
alive lines will be given by 1− p meaning that no single
additional line fails other than those that are initially at-
tacked, whereas the whole system will suddenly collapse
if the attack size exceeds p⋆. These cases are reminis-
cent of the most catastrophic and unexpected large-scale
collapses observed in the real world. We provide explicit
conditions on the distribution PL(x) of the loads and the
tolerance parameter α that distinguish the two cases.
Last but not least, we show that p⋆ is maximized when
the load distribution is a Dirac delta function centered
at E [L], i.e., when all lines carry the same load. The
optimal p⋆ is shown to be given by αα+1 , regardless of the
mean load E [L]. This finding is particularly surprising
given that complex networks are known to be extremely
robust against random failures when their degree distri-
bution is broad [16]; e.g., when the number of links inci-
dent on a line follows a power-law distribution.
We believe that our results provide interesting insights
into the dynamics of cascading failures in power systems.
In particular, they can help design power systems in a
more robust manner. The results obtained here may have
applications in fields other than power systems as well.
Fiber bundle models have been used in a wide range of
applications including fatigue [17], failure of composite
materials [18], landslides [19], etc. A particularly inter-
esting application is the study of the traffic jams in roads
[20], where the capacity of a line can be regarded as the
traffic flow capacity of a road.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we
give the details of our system model, discuss how it com-
pares with other models in the literature, and comment
on its applicability in power systems. Analytical results
regarding the robustness of the system against random
attacks are provided in Section III for general load distri-
butions. These results are discussed in more details for
three specific load distributions in Section IV and various
load-distribution-specific conclusions are drawn. Section
V is devoted to numerical results that confirm the main
findings of the paper for systems of finite size. In Section
VI, we derive the optimal load distribution that leads to
maximum robustness among all distributions with the
same mean, and the paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. MODEL DEFINITIONS
We consider a power system with N transmission lines
whose initial loads (i.e., power flows) L1, . . . , LN are
independent and identically distributed with PL(x) :=
P [L ≤ x]. The corresponding probability density func-
tion is given by pL(x) =
d
dxPL(x). Let Lmin denote the
minimum value L can take; i.e.,
Lmin = sup{x : PL(x) = 0}.
We assume that Lmin > 0. We also assume that the
density pL(x) is continuous on its support.
The capacity of a line defines the maximum power flow
that it can sustain, and is typically [21–24] set to be a
fixed factor of the line’s original load. To that end, we
let the capacity Ci of line i be given by
Ci = (1 + α)Li, i = 1, . . . , N, (1)
with α > 0 defining the tolerance parameter. For sim-
plicity, we assume that all lines have the same tolerance
parameter α, but it would be of interest to extend our
results to the case where the tolerance parameter αi of
a line i is randomly selected from a probability distribu-
tion, for each i = 1, . . . , N . A line fails (i.e., outages) if
its load exceeds its capacity at any given time. In that
case, the load it was carrying before the failure is redis-
tributed equally among all remaining lines.
Our main goal is to study the robustness of this power
system against random attacks that result with a fail-
ure of a p-fraction of the lines; of course, all the discus-
sion and accompanying results do hold for the robustness
against random failures as well. The initial set of failures
leads to redistribution of power flows from the failed lines
to alive ones (i.e., non-failed lines), so that the load on
each alive line becomes equal to its initial load plus its
equal share of the total load of the failed lines. This
may lead to the failure of some additional lines due to
the updated flow exceeding their capacity. This process
may continue recursively, generating a cascade of fail-
ures, with each failure further increasing the load on the
alive lines, and may eventually result with the collapse
of the entire system. Throughout, we let n∞(p) denote
the final fraction of alive lines when a p-fraction of lines
is randomly attacked. The robustness of a power system
will be evaluated by the behavior of n∞(p) as the attack
size p increases, and particularly by the critical attack
size p⋆ at which n∞(p) drops to zero.
Our formulation is partially inspired by the democratic
fiber bundle model [12, 13], where N parallel fibers with
random failure thresholds C1, . . . , CN (i.e., capacities)
drawn independently from PC(x) share equally an ap-
plied total force of F ; see also [20, 25–27]. This model
has been recently adopted by Pahwa et al. [11] in the con-
text of power systems with F corresponding to the total
load that N power lines share equally. A major difference
of our setting with the original democratic fiber-bundle
model is that in the latter the total load of the system
3is always fixed at F . This ensures that the load that
each alive line carries at any given time is independent of
the specific set of lines that have failed until that time.
For example if M lines out of the original N are alive,
one can easily compute the load per alive line as F/M re-
gardless of which N−M lines have actually failed. In our
model, however, the initial loads of N lines are random
and they differ from each other, and so do their capaci-
ties. This leads to strong dependencies between the load
of an alive line and the particular N − M set of lines
that have failed, and makes it impossible to compute the
former merely from the number of failed lines. For in-
stance, at any given time, lines that are alive are likely
to have a larger capacity, and thus a larger initial load
in view of (1), than those that have failed. In addition,
the total load shed on to the alive lines is not given by
(N−M)E [L], since the lines that have failed are likely to
have a smaller capacity, and thus a smaller initial load,
than average. As a result of these intricate dependencies,
analysis of cascading failures in our setting becomes sub-
stantially more challenging than that in the fiber-bundle
model; see Section III for details.
We believe that our problem formulation can lead to
significant insights for the robustness of power systems
(and possibly of other real-world systems) that can not
be seen in the original fiber-bundle model. First of all,
our formulation allows analyzing the robustness of the
system against external attacks or random line failures,
which are known to be the source of system-wide black-
outs in many interdependent systems [5, 10, 28]; the
standard fiber-bundle model is instead concerned with
failures triggered by increasing the total force (i.e., load)
applied to the system. Secondly, unlike the democratic
fiber bundle model where all lines start with the same
initial load [29], power lines in real systems are likely to
have different loads at the initial set-up although they
may participate equally in taking over the load of those
lines that have failed; intuitively speaking, this is also the
case for traffic flow on roads.
Our model has some similarities also with the CAS-
CADE model introduced by Dobson et al. [30]. There,
they assume that initial loads L1, . . . , LN are uniformly
distributed over an interval (Lmin, Lmax), and all lines
have the same capacity C = Lmax. This is a significant
difference from our model where capacities vary accord-
ing to (1). Another major difference is that in the CAS-
CADE model, a fixed amount ∆ is redistributed to all
alive lines irrespective of the load being carried before
failure. Therefore, strong dependencies between particu-
lar lines failed and the load carried by alive lines do not
exist in the CASCADE model.
A word on notation in use: The random variables (rvs)
under consideration are all defined on the same probabil-
ity space (Ω,F ,P). Probabilistic statements are made
with respect to this probability measure P, and we de-
note the corresponding expectation operator by E. The
indicator function of an event A is denoted by 1 [A].
III. ANALYTIC RESULTS
A. Recursive Relations
We now provide the mean-field analysis of the cas-
cading failures of lines for the model described in Sec-
tion II. We start by deriving recursive relations concern-
ing the fraction ft of lines that are failed at time stage
t = 0, 1, . . .. The number of links that are still alive at
time t is then given by Nt = N(1−ft) for all t = 0, 1, . . ..
The cascading failures start with a random attack that
targets a fraction p of power lines, whence we have f0 = p.
Upon the failure of these f0p lines, their load will be redis-
tributed to the remaining (1− f0)N lines. The resulting
extra load per alive line, Q0 is given by
Q0 =
E [L] pN
(1− p)N
= E [L]
f0
1− f0
. (2)
At this initial stage, since the pN lines that have been
attacked are selected uniformly at random, the mean to-
tal load that will be transferred to the remaining lines is
just given by E [L] pN .
Now, in the next stage a line i that survived the initial
attack will fail if and only if its new load reaches its
capacity [31]; i.e., if
Li +Q0 ≥ (1 + α)Li,
or, equivalently if Li ≤ Q0/α. Therefore, at stage t = 1,
an additional fraction P [L ≤ Q0/α] of lines will fail from
the lines that were alive at the end of stage 0. This gives
f1 = f0+(1−f0)P [L ≤ Q0/α] = 1−(1−f0)P
[
L >
Q0
α
]
.
In order to compute Q1, i.e., the total extra load per
alive line at stage 1, we should sum the total load of all
the failed lines until this stage and divide it by the new
system size 1− f1. So, Q1(1− f1) is given by the sum of
Q0(1− f0), and the total load of the lines failed at stage
1 normalized by the number of lines N ; i.e., of lines that
survived the initial attack but have load L ≤ Q0/α. Let
A be the initial set of lines attacked. We get
Q1(1− f1) = Q0(1− f0) +
1
N
· E

 ∑
i6∈A:Li≤Q0/α
Li


= Q0(1− f0) +
1
N
· E

∑
i6∈A
Li1 [Li ≤ Q0/α]


= Q0(1− f0) +
1
N
·
∑
i6∈A
E [Li1 [Li ≤ Q0/α]]
= Q0(1− f0) + (1− f0)E [L1 [L ≤ Q0/α]] ,
where the last step uses |A|/N = p = f0. Thus, we get
Q1 =
pE [L] + (1 − p)E [L · 1 [L ≤ Q0/α]]
1− f1
4upon noting (2). We find it useful to note that
E [L · 1 [L ≤ Q0/α]] = E [L | L ≤ Q0/α]P [L ≤ Q0/α] .
The general form of ft and Qt will become apparent as
we compute them at stage t = 2. This time we argue as
follows. For a line to still stay alive at this stage, two con-
ditions need to be satisfied: i) it should not have failed
until this stage, which happens with probability 1 − f1;
and ii) its load should satisfy L > Q1/α so that its ca-
pacity is still larger than its current load. One additional
note is that a line that satisfies condition (i) necessarily
have a load L > Q0/α. Collecting, we obtain
f2 = 1− (1− f1)P [L > Q1/α | L > Q0/α] .
The total load that will be redistributed to the remaining
lines can then be computed as before:
Q2(1− f2) = Q0(1− f0) +
1
N
· E

 ∑
i6∈A:Li≤Q1/α
Li


= Q0(1− f0) + (1− f0)E [L1 [L ≤ Q1/α]] .
One can complicate the matters a little bit and get the
same expression by writing
Q2(1− f2) = Q1(1− f1) +
1
N
E

 ∑
i6∈A:Q0/α<Li≤Q1/α
Li


as well.
The form of the recursive equations is now clear. Let
f0 = p, N0 = N(1 − p), and Q0 = E [L]
p
1−p . For conve-
nience, also let Q−1 = 0. Then, for each t = 0, 1, . . ., we
have
ft+1 = 1− (1 − ft)P
[
L > Qtα
∣∣∣∣ L > Qt−1α
]
Qt+1 =
pE[L]+(1−p)E[L·1[L≤Qtα ]]
1−ft+1
Nt+1 = (1 − ft+1)N
(3)
From (3) we see that cascades stop and a steady is
reached, i.e., Nt+2 = Nt+1, if
P
[
L >
Qt+1
α
∣∣∣∣ L > Qtα
]
= 1. (4)
In order to understand the conditions that would lead to
(4), we need to simplify the recursion on ft. This step is
taken in the next section.
B. Conditions for steady-state via a simplification
Applying the first relation in (3) repeatedly, we see
that
1− ft+1 = (1− ft)P [L > Qt/α | L > Qt−1/α]
1− ft = (1− ft−1)P [L > Qt−1/α | L > Qt−2/α]
...
1− f1 = (1− f0)P [L > Q0/α]
Applying these recursively, we obtain
1− ft+1 = (1− f0)
t∏
ℓ=0
P [L > Qℓ/α | L > Qℓ−1/α] ,
where Q−1 = 0 as before. Since Qt is monotone increas-
ing in t, i.e., Qt+1 ≥ Qt for all t, we further obtain
1− ft+1
= (1− f0)
P
[
L > Qtα
]
P
[
L > Qt−1α
] · P
[
L > Qt−1α
]
P
[
L > Qt−2α
] · · · P
[
L > Q1α
]
P
[
L > Q0α
]
· P
[
L >
Q0
α
]
= (1− f0)P [L > Qt/α] (5)
Reporting this into (3) and recalling that f0 = p, we
get the following simplified recursions:
ft+1 = 1− (1− ft)P
[
L > Qtα | L >
Qt−1
α
]
Qt+1 =
pE[L]+(1−p)E[L·1[L≤Qtα ]]
(1−p)P[L>Qt/α]
Nt+1 = (1− p)P [L > Qt/α]N
(6)
Failures will stop and a steady-state will be reached when
ft+2 = ft+1. From the first relation in (6), we see that
this holds if
P [L > Qt+1/α | L > Qt/α] = 1,
or, equivalently if
P

L > pE [L] + (1− p)E
[
L · 1
[
L ≤ Qtα
]]
α(1 − p)P [L > Qt/α]
∣∣∣∣∣ L > Qtα


= 1, (7)
as we use the middle equation in (6).
Define x := Qt/α, and realize that
pE [L] + (1− p)E [L · 1 [L ≤ x]]
= pE [L] + (1 − p)E [L · (1 − 1 [L > x])]
= E [L]− (1− p)E [L · 1 [L > x]] .
With these in place, the condition for cascades to stop
(7) gives
P
[
L >
E [L]− (1 − p)E [L · 1 [L > x]]
α(1 − p)P [L > x]
∣∣∣∣∣ L > x
]
= 1.
(8)
It is now clear how to obtain the final fraction of power
lines that are still alive at the end of the cascading fail-
ures: One must find the smallest solution x⋆ of (8). Then,
the final fraction n∞(p) of alive lines is given (see (5)) by
n∞(p) = 1− f∞ = (1− p)P [L > x
⋆] . (9)
Under the enforced assumptions on the distribution of
L, we see that (8) holds in either one of the following
cases:
5i) If x ≥ E[L]−(1−p)E[L·1[L>x]]α(1−p)P[L>x] ; or,
ii) If x < E[L]−(1−p)E[L·1[L>x]]α(1−p)P[L>x] and
P
[
L >
E [L]− (1− p)E [L · 1 [L > x]]
α(1− p)P [L > x]
]
= 1. (10)
We see that in the latter case, it automatically holds
P [L > x] = 1, meaning that the final system size equals
1 − p. In other words, no single line fails other than the
pN lines that went down as a result of the initial attack.
Using P [L > x] = 1 in (10), we see that this happens
whenever P
[
L > pE[L]α(1−p)
]
= 1, which can be regarded as
the condition for no cascade of failures. This condition
can help in capacity provisioning, i.e., in determining the
factor α needed for robustness against p-size attacks, and
can be rewritten as
Lmin >
pE [L]
α(1 − p)
. (11)
The first condition, on the other hand, amounts to
P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x]) ≥
E [L]
1− p
. (12)
We can now see that the final system size n∞(p) is al-
ways given by (1 − p)P [L > x⋆] where x⋆ is the small-
est solution of (12). This is clearly true for the case (i)
given above. To see why this approach also works for
the case (ii), observe that when (11) holds (12) is sat-
isfied for any x in [ pE[L]α(1−p) , Lmin]. Hence, the smallest
solution x⋆ of (12) will always give x⋆ ≤ Lmin, leading to
(1−p)P [L > x⋆] = 1−p. As discussed before, no cascade
takes place under (11) (i.e., in the case (ii) above), so the
final system size is indeed 1− p.
For a graphical solution of n∞(p), one shall plot
P [L > x] (αx + E [L | L > x]) as a function of x (e.g., see
Figure 1(a)), and draw a horizontal line at the height
E [L] /(1 − p) on the same plot. The leftmost intersec-
tion of these two lines gives the operating point x⋆, from
which we can compute n∞(p) = (1−p)P [L > x
⋆]. When
there is no intersection, we set x⋆ = ∞ and understand
that n∞(p) = 0.
C. Rupture Condition
We now know how to compute the final system size
n∞(p) for a given attack size p. In many cases, we will
be interested in the variation of n∞(p) as a function of p.
This will help us understand the response of the system
to attacks of varying magnitude. Of particular interest
will be to derive the critical attack size p⋆ such that for
any attack with size p > p⋆, the system undergoes a
complete breakdown leading to n∞(p) = 0.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) We demonstrate the distinction be-
tween an abrupt first-order rupture, and a first-order rupture
that is preceded by a diverging failure rate. pL(x) is assumed
to be of uniform density over the range [Lmin, Lmax] = [10, 50].
In both plots, Red curves stand for the case where α = 0.2,
whereas Blue curves represent α = 1.2. Figure 1(a) shows
P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x]), whereas Figure 1(b) plots the
corresponding variation of n∞(p) with attack size p. We ob-
serve that for α = 0.2 (Red), P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x])
takes its maximum at the point x = Lmin = 10. As a result,
we see an abrupt first-order transition of n∞(p) as it suddenly
drops to zero at the point p = p⋆ = 0.0625, while decaying
linearly as 1−p up until that point. The case where α = 1.2 is
clearly different as P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x]) is now max-
imized at x = 17.6 > Lmin. As expected from our discussion,
this ensures that the total failure of the system occurs after
a diverging failure rate is observed. This divergence is clearly
seen in Figure 1(b) where the dashed line corresponds to the
1− p curve.
6From (12) and the discussion that follows, we see that
the maximum attack size p⋆ is related to the global max-
imum of the function P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x]). In
fact, it is easy to see that
p⋆ = 1−
E [L]
max
x
{P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x])}
. (13)
The critical point x⋆ that maximizes the function
P [L > x] (αx + E [L | L > x]) can shed light on the type
of the transition that the system undergoes as the at-
tack size increases. First of all, the system will al-
ways undergo a first-order (i.e., discontinuous) transi-
tion at the point p⋆. This can be seen as follows: We
have n∞(p
⋆+) = 0 by virtue of the fact that no x will
satisfy (12), and cascading failures will continue until
the whole system breaks down. On the other hand,
n∞(p
⋆−) = (1 − p)P [L > x⋆] > 0 where x⋆ is the point
that maximizes P [L > x] (αx + E [L | L > x]). We can
see why it must hold P [L > x⋆] > 0 via contradic-
tion: P [L > x⋆] = 0 implies that the maximum value of
P [L > x] (αx + E [L | L > x]) is zero, which clearly does
not hold since at x = 0 this function equals E [L] > 0 by
non-negativity of L.
An interesting question is whether this first order rup-
ture at the point p⋆ will have any early indicators at
smaller attack sizes; e.g., a diverging failure rate leading
to a non-linear decrease in n∞(p). With Lmin > 0, we
know from (11) that for p sufficiently small, there will be
no cascades and n∞(p) will decrease linearly as 1−p. This
corresponds to the situations where (12) is satisfied at a
point x ≤ Lmin, i.e., when P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x])
is linearly increasing with x. An abrupt first-order tran-
sition is said to take place if the linear decay of n∞(p) is
followed by a sudden discontinuous jump to zero at the
point p⋆. Those cases are reminiscent of the real-world
phenomena of unexpected large-scale system collapses;
i.e., cases where seemingly identical attacks/failures lead-
ing to entirely different consequences.
It is easy to see that an abrupt transition occurs if
P [L > x] (αx + E [L | L > x]) takes its maximum at the
point x = Lmin; see Figure 1. In that case, (12) either
has a solution at some x ≤ Lmin so that n∞(p) = 1 − p,
or has no solution leading to n∞(p) = 0. Under the as-
sumptions enforced here, P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x])
is continuous at every x ≥ 0. Given that this function
is linear increasing on the range 0 ≤ x ≤ Lmin, a maxi-
mum takes place at x = Lmin if at that point the derivate
changes its sign. We have
d
dx
(P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x])) (14)
=
d
dx
(αxP [L > x] + E [L · 1 [L > x]])
= αP [L > x] + αx(−pL(x)) +
d
dx
(∫ ∞
x
tpL(t)dt
)
= αP [L > x] + αx(−pL(x)) − xpL(x)
= αP [L > x]− xpL(x)(α + 1) (15)
where in the second to last step we used the Leibniz
integral rule. As expected, for x < Lmin, we have
P [L > x] = 1 and pL(x) = 0, so that the derivative is
constant at α. For an abrupt rupture to take place, the
derivative should be negative at the point x = Lmin; i.e.,
we need
α− Lmin · pL(Lmin)(α+ 1) < 0,
or, equivalently
α
(α+ 1)Lmin
< pL(Lmin). (16)
It is important to note that (16) ensures only
the existence of a local maximum of the function
P [L > x] (αx + E [L | L > x]) at the point x = Lmin.
This in turn implies that there will be a first order jump
in n∞(p) at the point where E [L] /(1−p) = αLmin+E [L];
i.e., at the point p that satisfies (11) with equality. How-
ever, for this condition to lead to an “abrupt” first-order
breakdown, we need x = Lmin to be the global maxi-
mum. This can be checked by finding all x that make
the derivate at (15) zero, and then comparing the corre-
sponding maximum points. If x = Lmin is only a local
maximum, then the system will have a sudden drop in
size at the corresponding attack size, but will not un-
dergo a complete failure; the complete failure and the
drop of n∞(p) to zero will take place at a larger attack
size where, again there will be a first-order transition;
e.g., see Figure 2.
We close by giving the general condition for first-order
jumps to take place. We need a change of sign of the
derivative at (15), leading to
±αP [L > x]− xpL(x)(α + 1)
∣∣∣∣
x=x⋆±
< 0.
Equivalently, a first-order jump will be seen for every x⋆
satisfying
pL(x
⋆−) <
αP [L > x⋆]
(α+ 1)x⋆
< pL(x
⋆+). (17)
IV. RESULTS WITH SPECIFIC
DISTRIBUTIONS
We analyze a few specific distributions in more details.
Namely, we will consider Uniform, Pareto, and Weibull
distributions.
A. Uniform distribution
Assume that loads L1, . . . , LN are uniformly dis-
tributed over [Lmin, Lmax]. In other words, we have
pL(x) =
1
Lmax − Lmin
· 1 [Lmin ≤ x ≤ Lmax] ,
7so that
P [L > x] =
Lmax − x
Lmax − Lmin
1 [Lmin ≤ x ≤ Lmax]
+ 1 [x < Lmin] . (18)
We see that over the range x in [0, Lmax), the derivative
of P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x]) (see (15)) is either never
zero or becomes zero only once at
x⋆ =
α
2α+ 1
Lmax,
For the latter to be possible, we need α2α+1Lmax ≥ Lmin.
If the opposite condition holds, i.e., if α2α+1Lmax < Lmin,
then P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x]) is maximized at x =
Lmin, and an abrupt first order break down will occur
(as p increases) without any preceding diverging failure
rate. As expected, the condition α2α+1Lmax < Lmin is
equivalent to the general rupture condition (16) and can
be written most compactly as
α <
Lmin
max (Lmax − 2Lmin, 0)
.
It follows that if Lmax ≤ 2Lmin, then an abrupt rupture
takes place irrespective of the tolerance factor α.
B. Pareto distribution
Distribution of many real world variables are shown
to exhibit a power-law behavior, with very large variabil-
ity [32–35]. To consider power systems where the initial
loads of the lines can exhibit high variance, we consider
the case where L1, . . . , LN are drawn from a Pareto dis-
tribution: Namely, with b, Lmin > 0, we set
pL(x) = L
b
minbx
−b−1
1 [x ≥ Lmin] .
To ensure that E [L] is finite, we also enforce that b > 1;
in that case we have E [L] = bLminb−1 . Then, the condition
for an abrupt first order rupture (16) gives
α
(α+ 1)Lmin
< LbminbL
−b−1
min ,
or, equivalently αα+1 < b. With b > 1, this always holds
meaning that when the loads are Pareto distributed,
there will always be an abrupt first order rupture at the
attack size p⋆ = 1 − E[L]
E[L]+αLmin
= 1 − 1
1+α b−1
b
. In fact,
we can see that this attack will lead to a complete break-
down of the system since for x ≥ Lmin, we have
d
dx
(P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x])) (19)
= αP [L > x]− xpL(x)(α + 1)
= αLbminx
−b − (α + 1)xLbminbx
−b−1
= Lbminx
−b (α− b(α+ 1))
< 0
for any α > 0 and b > 1. Therefore, it is always the
case that (P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x])) has a unique
maximum at x = Lmin, and the abrupt first order rupture
completely breaks down the system.
These results show that for a given Lmin and E [L] with
E [L] > Lmin, Pareto distribution is the worst possible
scenario in terms of the overall robustness of the power
system. Put differently, with Lmin and E [L] fixed, the
robustness curve n∞(p) for the Pareto distribution con-
stitutes a lower bound for that of any other distribu-
tion. From a design perspective, we see that changing
the tolerance parameter α will not help in mitigating the
abruptness of the breakdown of the system in the case of
Pareto distributed loads. On the other hand, the point
at which the abrupt failure takes place, i.e., the critical
attack size p⋆ can be increased by increasing α.
C. Weibull distribution
The last distribution we will consider is Weibull distri-
bution, which has the form
pL(x) =
k
λ
(
x− Lmin
λ
)k−1
e
−
(
x−Lmin
λ
)k
1 [x ≥ Lmin] ,
with λ, k > 0. The case k = 1 corresponds to
the exponential distribution, and k = 2 corresponds
to Rayleigh distribution. The mean load is given
by E [L] = Lmin + λΓ(1 + 1/k), where Γ(·) is the
gamma-function. As usual, we check the derivative of
(P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x])) for x ≥ Lmin. On that
range, we have P [L > x] = e
−
(
x−Lmin
λ
)k
so that
d
dx
(P [L > x] (αx + E [L | L > x]))
= e
−
(
x−Lmin
λ
)k (
α− (α+ 1)x
k
λ
(
x− Lmin
λ
)k−1)
(20)
which becomes zero if
x(x − Lmin)
k−1 =
αλk
(α+ 1)k
. (21)
This already prompts us to consider the cases k < 1
and k > 1 separately. In fact, with k > 1, we see that
pL(Lmin) = 0 and (16) does not hold regardless of α. In
addition, there is one and only one x > Lmin that can
satisfy (21). Consequently, for k ≥ 1 the system will al-
ways undergo a second-order transition with a diverging
rate of failure before breaking down completely through
a first-order transition.
The case k < 1 gives an entirely different picture since
pL(Lmin) = ∞ and (16) always holds regardless of α.
So, the system will always go through an abrupt first
order transition at the attack size p⋆ = 1 − E[L]
E[L]+αLmin
.
Whether this rupture will entirely breakdown the system
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FIG. 2. The two stage breakdown of the system is demon-
strated, where L1, . . . , LN are drawn from Weibull distribu-
tion with k = 0.8, λ = 150, Lmin = 10, α = 0.2. We plot
the relative final size n∞(p) as a function of the attack size
p. The Inset zooms in to the region where the system goes
through a series of first-order, second-order, and then again a
first-order transition.
depends on the existence of the solutions of (21). It is
easy to see that x(x−Lmin)
k−1 takes its minimum value
at x = Lmin/k and equals to
Lkmin
k
(
1−k
k
)k−1
. Thus, if it
holds that
Lkmin
(
1− k
k
)k−1
>
αλk
α+ 1
, (22)
then (21) has no solution and the derivative given
at (20) is negative for all x ≥ Lmin, meaning that
P [L > x] (αx + E [L | L > x]) is maximized at x = Lmin.
Then, the abrupt first order rupture at p⋆ = 1 −
E[L]
E[L]+αLmin
will indeed breakdown the system completely.
The same conclusion follows if (22) holds with equality
by virtue of the fact that (20) is again non-positive for
all x ≥ Lmin.
On the other hand, if
Lkmin
(
1− k
k
)k−1
<
αλk
α+ 1
, (23)
then (21) will have two solutions both with x > Lmin.
This implies that P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x]) has an-
other maximum at a point x > Lmin. If this maximum
is indeed the global maximum (i.e., it is larger than the
maximum attained at x = Lmin), then the system will
go under two first-order phase transitions before break-
ing down. First, an abrupt rupture will take place at
p∗ = 1 − E[L]
E[L]+αLmin
. But, this won’t break down the
system completely and n∞(p
∗+) will be positive. As p
increases further, we will observe a second-order transi-
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FIG. 3. (Color Online). We plot n∞(p) vs. p under six
different cases. Analytical results are represented by lines,
whereas empirical results (obtained through averaging over
500 independent runs) are represented by symbols. We set
N = 100, 000, Lmin = 10, and E [L] = 30. For the case
when L1, . . . , LN follow a Weibull distribution, we take the
shape parameter to be k = 2, leading to a scale parameter
λ = 22.5676. We see that numerical results match the ana-
lytical results very well.
tion with a diverging rate of failure until another first-
order rupture breaks down the system completely. We
demonstrate this phenomenon in Figure 2, where we set
k = 0.8, λ = 150, Lmin = 10, α = 0.2. We empha-
size that this behavior (i.e., occurrence of two first-order
transitions) is not immediately warranted under (23). It
is also needed that P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x]) has a
global maximum at a point x > Lmin.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now check the validity of our mean-field analysis
for finite number N of power lines via simulations. We
will do so with an eye towards comparing the robustness
of power systems under different distributions of loads.
In the first batch of simulations, we fix the minimum
load at Lmin = 10 and mean load at E [L] = 30. These
constraints fully determine the load distribution pL(x)
in the cases where pL is Uniform (with Lmin = 10 and
Lmax = 50) or Pareto (with Lmin = 10 and b = 1.5). For
the case where pL is Weibull, we need to pick k and λ
such that λΓ(1+1/k) = 20, where Γ(x) =
∫∞
0
tx−1e−tdt.
We consider k = 2, λ = 22.5676 as an example point.
Our simulation set up is as follows. We fix the
number of lines N , and generate N random variables
from the given distribution pL(x) corresponding to loads
L1, . . . , LN . Then, for a given p, we perform an attack on
⌈pN⌉ lines that are selected uniformly at random and as-
9sume those lines have failed. Next, using the democratic
redistribution of loads, we iteratively fail any line whose
load exceeds its capacity (which is set to (1+α) times its
initial load). We consider two possible tolerance param-
eters: i) α = 0.2 and ii) α = 0.7. The process stops when
the system is stable; i.e., all lines have a load below their
capacity. Of course, this steady state can be reached at
a point where all lines in the system have failed. We
record the corresponding fraction of active lines at the
steady state. This process is repeated independently 500
times for each p, and the average fraction of active lines
at the steady state over 500 independent runs gives the
empirical value of n∞(p). We then compare this with the
quantity obtained from our analysis in Section III.
Results are depicted in Figure 3. First of all, we see an
almost perfect agreement between our mean-field analy-
sis and numerical results. It is worth noting that the fit
between analysis and simulations required particularly
large values of N in the case of Pareto distribution. For
the other two distributions, even N = 5000 leads to al-
most perfect agreement. Focusing on two curves corre-
sponding to uniform distribution, we see from Figure 3
that the tolerance parameter α not only changes the max-
imum attack size p⋆ that the system can sustain (in the
sense of not breaking down entirely), but it can also af-
fect the type of the phase transition. In particular, with
α = 0.2, an abrupt failure takes place at p⋆ = 0.0625,
whereas with α = 0.7 the system goes through a second
order transition starting with the attack size p = 0.189,
and then breaks down entirely through a first-order jump
at p⋆ = 0.203.
As expected from our previous discussion, the distribu-
tion that leads to the worst robustness is Pareto among
all distributions considered here. However, we see that
under certain conditions uniform and Weibull distribu-
tions can match the poor robustness characteristics of
the Pareto distribution; one example is the case shown
in Figure 3 with uniform load distribution and α = 0.2.
Finally, we observe that Weibull distribution can lead to
a significantly better robustness than Pareto and Uni-
form distribution, under the same mean and minimum
load.
The last observation worths investigating further. In
particular, even when Lmin and E [L] are fixed, the
Weibull distribution has another degree of freedom; i.e.,
parameters k and λ are arbitrary subject to the condition
that λΓ(1 + 1/k) = E [L]. In order to understand the ef-
fect of the shape parameter k in the robustness of power
systems under Weibull distributed loads, we ran another
set of simulations with N = 100, 000, α = 0.7, Lmin = 10,
E [L] = 30, and λ = 20Γ(1+1/k) for various values of k.
Results are depicted in Figure 4 where again analytical
results are represented by lines and empirical results (ob-
tained through averaging over 500 independent runs) are
represented by symbols. We again observe an excellent
match between analytical and numerical results. We re-
mark that with the given parameter setting, the cases
where k ≤ 1 all result in the same robustness behavior
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FIG. 4. (Color Online). We plot n∞(p) vs. p when L1, . . . , LN
follow a Weibull distribution with Lmin = 10, E [L] = 30. We
set N = 100, 000 and α = 0.7. Analytical results are repre-
sented by lines, whereas empirical results (obtained through
averaging over 500 independent runs) are represented by sym-
bols. Again, we see that numerical results match the analyt-
ical results pretty well.
with an abrupt first-order rupture at p = 0.189.
More importantly, we see that the robustness of the
system improves as the parameter k increases. It is
known that as k gets larger the Weibull distribution gets
closer and closer to a Dirac delta distribution centered at
its mean. In other words, as k goes to infinity the Weibull
distribution converges to a degenerate distribution and
loads L1, . . . , LN will all be equal to the mean E [L].
This naturally prompts us to ask whether a degenerate
distribution of loads is the universally optimum strat-
egy among all possible distributions with the same mean
E [L], with optimality criterion being the maximization
of robustness against random attacks or failures. Here, a
natural condition for maximization of robustness would
be to maximize the critical attack size p⋆. We answer
this question, in the affirmative, in the next section.
VI. OPTIMAL LOAD DISTRIBUTION
To drive the above point further and to better under-
stand the impact of the shape parameter k on the sys-
tem robustness, we now plot the maximum attack size
p⋆ as a function of k under the same setting; see Figure
5. Namely, we let L1, . . . , LN follow a Weibull distribu-
tion with Lmin = 10, and λ = 20/Γ(1 + 1/k) so that
E [L] = 30. We see from Figure 5 that, in all choices of
α considered here, the maximum attack size p⋆ is mono-
tone increasing with k; note that p⋆ is seen to be constant
over the range 0 < k ≤ 1. It is also evident from Figure
5 that p⋆ tends to converge to a fixed value as k → ∞.
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FIG. 5. (Color Online). We plot the maximum attack size p⋆,
when L1, . . . , LN follow a Weibull distribution with Lmin =
10, E [L] = 30, as a function of the shape parameter k of
the Weibull distribution. We set N = 100, 000 and consider
four tolerance parameters α = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7. The curves
correspond to analytical results computed directly from (13).
On the other hand, with k → ∞, we know that Weibull
distribution converges to a Dirac delta distribution cen-
tered at E [L]. It is therefore of interest to check whether
p⋆ is always maximized by choosing all loads L1, . . . , LN
equally, i.e., by choosing pL(x) to be a degenerate distri-
bution with mean E [L] and zero variance.
Let pL(x) be an arbitrary distribution with mean E [L],
and assume that pL(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0; i.e., that L is non-
negative. Recall that maximum attack size p⋆ is given
by (13) and observe that
P [L > x] (αx + E [L | L > x])
= αxP [L > x] + E [L · 1 [L > x]]
≤ αE [L] + E [L · 1 [L > x]] (24)
≤ (α+ 1)E [L] , (25)
for any x ≥ 0. In (24) we used the Markov Inequality [36,
p. 151], i.e., the fact that P [L > x] ≤ E [L] /x for any
non-negative random variable L and x ≥ 0. Reporting
(25) into (13), we get
p⋆ ≤ 1−
E [L]
(α+ 1)E [L]
=
α
α+ 1
. (26)
This shows that the maximum attack size can never
exceed αα+1 under any choice of load distribution. On
the other hand, consider the case where pL(x) = δ(E [L])
with δ(·) denoting a Dirac delta function. This implies
that L1 = · · · = LN = E [L]. Let p
⋆
dirac denote the cor-
responding maximum attack size. With x = E [L]
−
, we
have P [L > x] = 1 and E [L · 1 [L > x]] = E [L]. Thus,
lim
x↑E[L]
αxP [L > x] + E [L · 1 [L > x]] = (α+ 1)E [L]
so that
max
x
{P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x])} ≥ (α+ 1)E [L] .
Invoking (13), this leads
p⋆dirac ≥
α
α+ 1
.
But, (26) holds for any distribution and hence is also
valid for p⋆dirac. Combining these, we obtain that
p⋆dirac =
α
α+ 1
. (27)
This establishes that a degenerate distribution is indeed
optimal for any given mean value of the load, and the
achieved maximum attack size is given by α/(α + 1).
What is even more remarkable is that, this maximum
attack size is independent of the mean load E [L].
It is now clear to what point the curves in Figure 5
tend to converge as k → ∞; they can indeed be seen
to get closer and closer to the corresponding value of
α/(α + 1). We close by demonstrating the variation of
the final system size as a function of the attack size, in the
case where loads follow a Dirac distribution. We easily
see that P [L > x] (αx+ E [L | L > x]) increases linearly
for x < E [L] and equals to zero for x ≥ E [L]. Therefore,
the breakdown of the system will always be through an
abrupt first order rupture.
This is demonstrated in Figure 6, where it is seen once
again that numerical results match the analysis perfectly.
Comparing these plots with Figures 3 and 4, we see the
dramatic impact that the load distribution has on the ro-
bustness of a power system. For instance, with α = 0.2
and mean load fixed at 30 we see that maximum attack
size that the system can sustain is 6.3% for Pareto and
Uniform distributions whereas it is 17% when all loads
are equal. Similarly, with α = 0.7 we see that maximum
attack size is 18% for Pareto distribution and 19% for
Uniform distribution, while for the Dirac delta distribu-
tion, it increases to 41%. These findings suggest that
under the democratic fiber bundle-like model considered
here, power systems with homogenous loads are signifi-
cantly more robust against random attacks and failures,
as compared to systems with heterogeneous load distri-
bution.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied the robustness of power systems consisting
of N lines under a democratic-fiber-bundle like model
and against random attacks. We show that the system
goes under a total breakdown through a first-order tran-
sition as the attack size reaches a critical value. We de-
rive the conditions under which the first-order rupture
occurs abruptly without any preceding divergence of the
failure rate; those situations correspond to cases where
no cascade of failures occurs until a critical attack size
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FIG. 6. (Color Online). We plot the final system size n∞(p) as
a function of the attack size p, when L1 = · · · = LN = E [L].
For the numerical results, we take N = 100, 000, E [L] = 30,
and consider four tolerance parameters α = 0.2, 0.7, 1.0, 2.0.
Each data point (represented by a symbol) is the result of
averaging over 500 independent runs. The lines correspond
to analytical results computed directly from (13). We see a
perfect agreement between analysis and experiments. In all
cases, the system breakdowns abruptly through a first order
transition at p⋆ = α
α+1
.
is reached, followed by a total breakdown at the critical
attack size. Numerical results are presented and confirm
the analytical findings. Last but not least, we prove that
with mean load fixed, robustness of the power system is
maximized when the variation among the line loads is
minimized. In other words, a Dirac delta load distribu-
tion leads to the optimum robustness.
Our results highlight how different parameters of the
load distribution and the power line capacity affect the
robustness of the power grid against failures and attacks.
To that end, our results can help derive guidelines for
the robust design of the power grid. We believe that the
results presented here give very interesting insights into
the cascade processes in power grids, although through
a very simplified model of the grid. The obtained results
can be useful in other fields as well, where equal redis-
tribution of flows is a reasonable assumption. Examples
include traffic jams, landslides, etc.
There are many open problems one can consider for
future work. For instance, the analysis can be extended
to the case where the tolerance parameter α is not the
same for all lines, but follows a given probability distri-
bution. It would be interesting to see if the robustness is
still maximized with a narrow distribution of α. It may
also be of interest to study robustness against targeted
attacks rather than random failures.
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